The Asian strategic landscape is entering a period in which traditional alliances are becoming less useful as a guide to understanding state behaviour. Countries are increasingly cooperating in one arena while competing in another, maintaining economic relationships with strategic rivals while building security partnerships with their competitors, and participating simultaneously in institutions that often have conflicting geopolitical orientations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
India is perhaps one of the clearest examples of this new diplomacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
New Delhi is a founding member of BRICS and has increasingly presented the grouping as an important platform for the Global South and reform of global governance. At the same time, India has developed increasingly close strategic relationships with the United States, Japan, Australia and European powers through arrangements such as the Quad and the Indo-Pacific framework. It has deepened economic and technological engagement with Taiwan without establishing formal diplomatic relations with Taipei. And, despite a serious strategic rivalry with China, India continues to regard stable India-China relations as essential to Asian stability and its own economic interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The result is a diplomatic geometry that cannot be described simply as \u201cpro-China\u201d or \u201canti-China\u201d, \u201cpro-Western\u201d or \u201canti-Western\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
India’s approach is better understood as multi-alignment<\/strong>: maintaining multiple strategic options simultaneously and using different partnerships for different objectives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This becomes particularly important as BRICS expands and acquires greater political and economic weight. The grouping now brings together major emerging economies from Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. The official BRICS 2026 platform describes the grouping as comprising eleven major emerging-market and developing countries, demonstrating how far the organisation has moved beyond its original five-member structure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the same time, Taiwan has become increasingly important to the global technology economy, particularly because of semiconductors, electronics, artificial intelligence and advanced manufacturing. Taiwan’s trade statistics show how strongly its economy has benefited from the global AI and semiconductor cycle, with exports exceeding $600 billion in 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For India, therefore, the Taiwan question is not simply a matter of China-Taiwan geopolitics. It is also about technology, industrialisation, supply-chain resilience, national security and India’s ambition to become a major manufacturing power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The central question is no longer whether India will \u201cchoose\u201d between China and Taiwan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The more consequential question is how India will manage relationships with China, Taiwan, BRICS and the wider Indo-Pacific simultaneously<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That is where the new geometry of Asian diplomacy is emerging.<\/p>\n\n\n\n BRICS began as an economic concept but has gradually developed into a wider diplomatic platform.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Its evolution reflects a broader transformation in international politics. Emerging powers increasingly argue that the institutions created after the Second World War do not adequately represent the distribution of economic and political power in the twenty-first century.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India shares part of this argument.<\/p>\n\n\n\n New Delhi has consistently advocated reform of international institutions, greater representation for developing countries and a stronger voice for the Global South. Yet India has also been careful not to allow BRICS to become a conventional anti-Western alliance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That distinction is fundamental.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For China and Russia, BRICS can potentially become a mechanism for reducing Western influence and building alternative financial, technological and political structures. For India, however, BRICS is more useful when it remains an open diplomatic platform rather than becoming an ideological bloc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Recent developments demonstrate this difference.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the 2026 BRICS summit in New Delhi, India worked to keep the grouping focused on development, economic resilience, supply chains, digital cooperation and reform of global institutions rather than allowing it to become an explicitly anti-American alliance. Reporting on the summit noted that India resisted efforts to turn BRICS into a strongly geopolitical bloc and kept controversial issues such as rapid de-dollarisation from dominating the agenda.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is not diplomatic indecision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is strategic calculation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India needs BRICS because the organisation gives New Delhi a seat at a table where China, Russia, Brazil, Iran, the Gulf states and other major emerging economies are represented.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But India also needs the United States, Japan and Europe for technology, investment, defence cooperation and access to advanced markets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Consequently, India’s preferred international order is not a replacement of one bloc by another. It is a multipolar order in which India itself has greater room for manoeuvre<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The greatest complication for India within BRICS is China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India and China are simultaneously competitors, trading partners, neighbouring powers and members of the same multilateral organisations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The relationship deteriorated sharply following the 2020 Galwan Valley confrontation. The subsequent years saw restrictions on Chinese investments, greater scrutiny of Chinese technology and a deterioration in political and business exchanges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yet the economic relationship proved difficult to unwind.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Reuters reported in September 2026 that China had become India’s largest import partner in the 2025-26 financial year, with bilateral trade reaching approximately $132 billion. The same report noted that the two countries had moved from severe confrontation toward cautious stabilisation following the 2024 disengagement agreement, while substantial disagreements remained.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This creates a fundamental contradiction in India’s China policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India wants to reduce strategic vulnerability to China while remaining economically connected to Chinese supply chains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It wants stronger domestic manufacturing while importing large quantities of machinery, electronics, industrial components and other inputs from China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It wants to strengthen partnerships with the United States, Japan, Australia and Europe while simultaneously participating in a grouping in which China is arguably the most powerful member.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This contradiction is not necessarily a weakness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It can be a source of leverage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The challenge is to prevent economic interdependence from becoming strategic dependence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That distinction will increasingly shape India’s approach to Taiwan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India does not maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, reflecting its longstanding policy concerning China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But formal diplomatic recognition is only one dimension of international relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Over the past several decades, India and Taiwan have built substantial unofficial relations covering trade, investment, education, technology and people-to-people exchanges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The relationship has gained particular significance as global supply chains are being reorganised.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Taiwan is one of the world’s most important centres for semiconductors, electronics and advanced manufacturing. Its importance increased dramatically with the expansion of artificial intelligence, cloud computing and high-performance computing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Taiwan’s Ministry of Finance reported that exports increased by 34.9 percent in 2025, while imports increased by 22.6 percent. Total exports reached approximately $640.7 billion. The ministry attributed much of this performance to the international AI supply chain and Taiwan’s role in semiconductor and ICT manufacturing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For India, this creates an opportunity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India has a large domestic market, a growing electronics industry, an expanding digital economy and an ambitious semiconductor policy. Taiwan possesses deep expertise in semiconductor manufacturing, electronics supply chains, precision engineering and industrial ecosystems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The two economies therefore have complementary strengths.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India brings scale.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Taiwan brings specialised technological capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The combination could become strategically significant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Economic relations provide perhaps the clearest evidence of the changing relationship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Taiwan’s official trade authorities report that bilateral trade with India reached approximately $12.516 billion in 2025, an increase of about 18 percent over the previous year. Taiwan’s exports to India include machinery, electronics, information products, chemical materials and automotive components.<\/p>\n\n\n\n More recent Taiwanese government data indicates that the relationship accelerated further in 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs, bilateral trade reached $12.516 billion in 2025, while trade during January-July 2026 increased by 56 percent compared with the same period a year earlier. Taiwan’s exports to India during this period were heavily concentrated in integrated circuits, with ICs accounting for about 51 percent of Taiwan’s exports to India.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These figures matter because they demonstrate that India-Taiwan relations are no longer simply a political signal directed at Beijing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n They have acquired a substantial economic foundation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Taiwanese investment in India is also expanding. Taiwanese authorities reported cumulative Taiwanese investment in India of about $1.737 billion as of June 2026, with around 350 Taiwanese companies operating in India and generating more than 200,000 jobs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is precisely the kind of relationship India wants to develop.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It can attract technology and capital without requiring New Delhi to formally alter its diplomatic position on Taiwan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If India-Taiwan relations were limited to conventional trade, their geopolitical significance would be considerably smaller.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Semiconductors change the equation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Modern economies depend on chips for automobiles, telecommunications, defence systems, smartphones, computers, satellites, industrial machinery and artificial intelligence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Taiwan occupies a critical position in this ecosystem.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India, meanwhile, wants to develop domestic semiconductor manufacturing and reduce vulnerabilities created by dependence on imported electronics and components.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This creates an obvious area of strategic convergence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The emerging India-Taiwan relationship is therefore not simply about buying Taiwanese chips.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is about building a broader ecosystem.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That could include semiconductor manufacturing, packaging and testing, electronic components, industrial automation, precision machinery, artificial intelligence, telecommunications, green technologies and advanced manufacturing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Taiwanese and Indian officials have increasingly discussed these areas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In June 2026, a Taiwan-India industrial cooperation working group discussed cooperation in 5G and satellite communications, pharmaceuticals, advanced CNC manufacturing, smart cities and artificial intelligence. The Taiwanese government described the two countries as having complementary strengths: India possesses a large market and skilled talent base, while Taiwan brings advanced manufacturing and supply-chain management capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is important because supply-chain diversification is becoming one of the central themes of global economics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The old model prioritised maximum efficiency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The new model increasingly prioritises resilience<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Companies want alternative manufacturing locations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Governments want domestic capabilities in critical technologies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Strategic competition has made dependence itself a national-security concern.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India is well positioned to benefit from this transformation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One of the most important consequences of geopolitical competition has been the emergence of the \u201cChina Plus One\u201d strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The concept is straightforward.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Instead of depending entirely on China for manufacturing, companies develop additional production centres elsewhere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India wants to become one of those centres.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Taiwanese companies have strong incentives to diversify production geographically because Taiwan itself faces geopolitical uncertainty and because many of its companies are already deeply integrated into global electronics supply chains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India offers several advantages: a huge consumer market, a large labour pool, engineering talent, government incentives and an expanding electronics ecosystem.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Taiwan offers technologies and industrial capabilities that can accelerate India’s manufacturing ambitions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The relationship is therefore mutually beneficial.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But India must be careful.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A \u201cChina Plus One\u201d strategy should not simply replace Chinese dependence with excessive dependence on another country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The objective should be diversification.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That means India must simultaneously build domestic capabilities and establish multiple foreign partnerships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Taiwan can be one pillar of that strategy, alongside Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe and Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is where the diplomatic geometry becomes complicated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Taiwan is not a BRICS member.<\/p>\n\n\n\n China is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Most BRICS countries are either supportive of, or at least cautious about challenging, China’s position regarding Taiwan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India therefore cannot treat Taiwan policy as if it were independent of its BRICS strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the same time, BRICS does not necessarily require India to abandon its economic engagement with Taiwan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This distinction is essential.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India can support the principle of peaceful resolution of disputes and oppose unilateral changes to the status quo while maintaining commercial, technological and educational relations with Taiwan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Such an approach allows New Delhi to avoid crossing Beijing’s most sensitive political red lines while still protecting Indian interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The same logic can be observed in India’s broader foreign policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India cooperates with Russia in defence and energy while simultaneously developing security cooperation with the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It works with China inside BRICS while competing with China in the Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It maintains relations with Iran while strengthening partnerships with Gulf monarchies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It participates in Western-led initiatives while arguing for reform of Western-dominated international institutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is the essence of multi-alignment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The timing of India’s BRICS diplomacy is especially significant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 2026 New Delhi summit provided an unusual setting for Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping to engage at a high level following years of tension.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The meeting was widely interpreted as evidence of cautious stabilisation rather than a complete strategic reconciliation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Modi emphasised mutual respect, sensitivity and mutual interest, while both sides sought to prevent bilateral differences from escalating into conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This distinction is crucial.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India is not abandoning competition with China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nor is China abandoning competition with India.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Both sides appear to recognise that uncontrolled confrontation would carry enormous economic and strategic costs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For India, improved relations with China provide greater diplomatic space.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If border tensions remain under control, New Delhi can devote more attention to economic growth, technological development, maritime security and its wider Indo-Pacific strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For China, stabilising relations with India can reduce the risk of strategic encirclement and create greater room for Beijing to focus on its competition with the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The result is not friendship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is managed rivalry<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And managed rivalry is increasingly becoming one of the defining characteristics of Asian diplomacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India’s relationship with Taiwan cannot be analysed without considering the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Washington sees Taiwan as central to Indo-Pacific security and global technology supply chains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India, meanwhile, has become one of the most important strategic partners for the United States in the Indo-Pacific.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But New Delhi has consistently resisted being absorbed into an American alliance structure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That distinction matters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India cooperates with Washington because American technology, investment, defence capabilities and strategic presence can contribute to Indian national interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But India does not want its foreign policy to become subordinate to American strategic priorities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is why India can deepen cooperation with Taiwan without turning Taiwan into an explicit anti-China alliance project.<\/p>\n\n\n\n New Delhi’s preferred approach is economic and technological engagement rather than military alignment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That gives India flexibility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It also reduces the possibility that India-Taiwan relations become a trigger for direct confrontation with China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A common analytical mistake is to imagine two separate systems:<\/p>\n\n\n\n One supposedly led by the United States and its Indo-Pacific partners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The other supposedly led by China and Russia through BRICS.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Reality is much more complicated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India exists in both worlds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Japan trades with China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n European economies remain deeply connected to China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Gulf countries cooperate with Washington while maintaining strong relationships with Beijing and Moscow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n ASEAN states increasingly practise their own forms of strategic hedging.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India’s diplomatic behaviour is therefore part of a wider Asian trend.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The region is moving from a system dominated by rigid alliances toward one characterised by overlapping partnerships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Countries want security partnerships without necessarily choosing political camps.<\/p>\n\n\n\n They want Chinese investment without Chinese domination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n They want American technology without American strategic control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n They want access to Russian energy without becoming dependent on Moscow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n They want economic relations with Taiwan without necessarily endorsing Taiwanese independence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is the new geometry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Taiwan issue also has a direct security dimension for India.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Any major conflict around Taiwan would disrupt shipping, semiconductor supplies, financial markets and technology networks across Asia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India’s economy would not be insulated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Indian Ocean is connected to the wider Asian maritime system through trade routes linking the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A Taiwan Strait crisis could therefore have consequences for Indian trade, energy supplies and manufacturing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India would also face difficult diplomatic choices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Should it remain neutral?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Should it support calls for a peaceful settlement?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Should it coordinate with partners such as Japan, Australia and the United States?<\/p>\n\n\n\n How would it manage its relationship with China during a regional crisis?<\/p>\n\n\n\n These questions do not have easy answers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But the growing economic relationship with Taiwan means that India has an increasingly direct stake in stability across the Taiwan Strait.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For India, strategic ambiguity may be more useful than explicit alignment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n New Delhi does not need to declare itself a participant in the Taiwan dispute to recognise Taiwan’s economic importance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nor does it need to endorse Taiwanese independence to expand technological cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Likewise, India does not need to become an anti-China power to compete with China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This ambiguity allows India to preserve diplomatic space.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It also reflects the broader Indian tradition of strategic autonomy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The objective is not neutrality for its own sake.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The objective is freedom of action.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India wants to retain the ability to make decisions based on its own interests rather than automatically following another power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That philosophy will probably remain central to Indian diplomacy as the world becomes more competitive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The strategy, however, carries significant risks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The first is Chinese retaliation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If India-Taiwan relations expand too quickly into politically sensitive areas, Beijing could respond through diplomatic pressure, economic measures or restrictions affecting bilateral trade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The second risk is overdependence on Taiwanese technology.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India’s objective should be to build domestic capacity, not simply substitute one external supplier for another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The third risk is strategic overextension.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India is already managing relationships with the United States, Russia, China, Japan, Europe, Iran, the Gulf and the wider Global South. Maintaining all these relationships requires considerable diplomatic skill.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The fourth risk is a Taiwan Strait crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India could find itself under pressure from multiple partners to take a position.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The fifth risk is economic fragmentation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If global technology systems increasingly split into rival Chinese and Western blocs, India could face pressure to choose technology standards, supply chains and financial systems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This would challenge India’s multi-alignment strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India’s most sustainable approach would be to deepen relations with Taiwan primarily through economic and technological channels while maintaining political restraint.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Five priorities stand out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India should encourage Taiwanese companies to participate in semiconductor manufacturing, packaging, testing, electronics and component ecosystems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India should use Taiwan partnerships to develop diversified supply chains rather than creating new strategic dependencies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Artificial intelligence, robotics, telecommunications, green technology, precision manufacturing and advanced materials offer areas where Indian and Taiwanese capabilities can complement each other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Education, tourism, academic exchanges and professional networks can deepen relations without creating unnecessary diplomatic confrontation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India’s Taiwan policy will be more sustainable if it is accompanied by continuous communication with China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This does not require India to accept Chinese pressure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It requires India to keep disagreements manageable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The most important transformation taking place in Asia is not the rise of one alliance against another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is the rise of overlapping strategic networks<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India is at the centre of several of them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Through BRICS, it engages China, Russia, Iran, Brazil and other emerging powers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Through the Quad, it works with the United States, Japan and Australia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Through expanding economic engagement, it is becoming more connected to Taiwan’s technology ecosystem.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Through the Indo-Pacific, it works with Southeast Asian and European partners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Through bilateral relations, it maintains important ties with the Gulf, Russia and other major powers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These networks overlap.<\/p>\n\n\n\n They sometimes contradict one another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But they also give India options.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The central strategic advantage for New Delhi is therefore not choosing the correct bloc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is avoiding unnecessary dependence on any single bloc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That may prove increasingly valuable as geopolitical competition intensifies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India’s relationship with BRICS, China and Taiwan illustrates a fundamental transformation in twenty-first-century diplomacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The old question was:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Which side are you on?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The emerging question is:<\/p>\n\n\n\n What interests can you advance through each relationship without surrendering strategic autonomy?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n India’s answer appears increasingly clear.<\/p>\n\n\n\n BRICS gives India a platform to influence the Global South and advocate reform of global governance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The United States and other Indo-Pacific partners provide technology, investment, defence cooperation and strategic balance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n China remains a competitor but also an indispensable economic partner and a major Asian power with which India must manage differences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Taiwan offers opportunities in semiconductors, electronics, advanced manufacturing and technology supply chains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These relationships are not mutually exclusive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n They are components of a larger Indian strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The challenge is maintaining equilibrium.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India cannot afford a return to the rigid bloc politics of the Cold War because its economic ambitions require access to multiple markets, technologies and sources of capital. Nor can it ignore the strategic risks created by China’s growing power or the possibility of conflict around Taiwan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The solution is neither confrontation nor passivity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is strategic autonomy backed by economic strength<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For Taiwan, India represents one of the world’s most promising large-scale markets and a potential manufacturing partner at a time when supply-chain diversification is becoming essential.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For India, Taiwan represents access to industrial expertise that can accelerate its technological ambitions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For China, the growing India-Taiwan relationship will remain sensitive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For BRICS, India’s position demonstrates the limits of turning the grouping into a rigid geopolitical alliance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And for Asia as a whole, the India-Taiwan-China triangle illustrates the region’s emerging diplomatic reality: competition and cooperation will increasingly exist simultaneously.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The future Asian order will therefore not be shaped solely in military alliances or formal treaties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It will be shaped in semiconductor factories, ports, technology partnerships, trade agreements, financial institutions, supply chains and diplomatic forums.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India’s ability to navigate these overlapping systems may determine whether it merely adapts to the new Asian order\u2014or becomes one of the principal powers shaping it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The new geometry of Asian diplomacy is already visible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India is not standing at one corner of it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is increasingly becoming one of its central points.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Asian strategic landscape is entering a period in which traditional alliances are becoming less useful as a guide to understanding state behaviour. Countries are increasingly cooperating in one arena while competing in another, maintaining economic relationships with strategic rivals while building security partnerships with their competitors, and participating simultaneously in institutions that often have […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":31,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-30","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/thestatemonitor.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/30","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/thestatemonitor.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/thestatemonitor.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thestatemonitor.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thestatemonitor.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=30"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/thestatemonitor.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/30\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":32,"href":"https:\/\/thestatemonitor.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/30\/revisions\/32"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thestatemonitor.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/31"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/thestatemonitor.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=30"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thestatemonitor.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=30"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thestatemonitor.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=30"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
\n\n\n\nBRICS Is No Longer Simply an Economic Acronym<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nThe China Factor at the Centre of India’s BRICS Strategy<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nTaiwan: From Diplomatic Sensitivity to Strategic Relevance<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nIndia-Taiwan Trade Is Moving Beyond Symbolism<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nThe Semiconductor Question Changes Everything<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nTaiwan and India’s \u201cChina Plus One\u201d Opportunity<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nThe Taiwan Question Inside BRICS<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nThe 2026 BRICS Summit and the India-China Reset<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nThe United States Complicates the Equation<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nThe Indo-Pacific and the BRICS Worlds Are Not Separate<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nWhy Taiwan Matters to India’s National Security<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nThe Strategic Value of Ambiguity<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nThe Risks for New Delhi<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nWhat India Should Do Next<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
First, expand semiconductor cooperation<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Second, build resilient supply chains<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Third, expand research cooperation<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Fourth, strengthen people-to-people relations<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Fifth, maintain diplomatic communication with Beijing<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nA New Asian Balance<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nConclusion: From Balancing Powers to Shaping the System<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nReferences and Research Sources<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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